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ABSTRACT 
The ‘standard’ Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki (ASY) model of tax evasion predicts effects on 
compliance which depend on the perceived probability of detection, tax rate and penalty for 
evasion. Compliance effects of detection probabilities and tax rates have been extensively tested 
empirically, but penalty effects are rarely tested explicitly. This paper examines the effects of late 
payment penalties on tax compliance based on an experiment involving New Zealand goods and 
service tax (GST) ‘late payers’. Firstly, based on an ASY-type model of tax late payments in which 
the probability of enforcement, rather than detection, is central, we develop a number of testable 
hypotheses. Secondly, based on a field experiment involving a specific compliance intervention, we 
examine how taxpayers respond when given different penalty information. The experiment also 
allows us to consider differences between taxpayers’ stated intentions to comply and subsequently 
observed compliance. Results suggest that differences in penalty information given to taxpayers 
and reductions in penalty rates both affect taxpayers stated intentions to comply (pay overdue tax 
and penalties) as predicted. However, subsequently observed responses generally appear 
unresponsive to penalties. Nevertheless, various individual taxpayer characteristics are identifiable 
that affect both compliance intentions and actual behaviour. 
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1. Introduction 
The so-called ‘standard model’ of tax evasion due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki 
(1974) – hereafter labelled the ‘ASY model’ – has been subjected to widespread challenge and 
empirical testing – the former mainly with respect to its paradoxical prediction that evasion is 
expected to be decreasing in the tax rate. Less controversially, the ASY model also predicts that 
compliance increases in the penalty rate applied to evaded tax. However, as Slemrod (2007, p.38) 
noted: “there has been no compelling empirical evidence addressing how noncompliance is affected by the penalty for 
detected evasion, as distinct from the probability that a given act of noncompliance will be subject to punishment”. 
Specific under-researched aspects include: whether high penalties elicit greater compliance as the 
ASY model predicts; how well taxpayers understand the penalty regime they face, and whether 
providing more accurate penalty information necessarily improves compliance? 
This paper explores these questions using the specific example of New Zealand’s Goods & 
Service Tax (GST) penalties,1 based on evidence from a field experiment involving New Zealand 
GST payers in debt to the revenue authority. This was designed to test for the effect on GST debt 
repayment choices of differing levels of, and taxpayer information on, GST late payment penalties. 
The experiment involved offering a random sample of tax debtors a penalty discount if they agreed 
to enter a repayment arrangement, after first providing those taxpayers with penalty regime 
information in differing degrees of detail. This allows us to examine whether indebted taxpayers 
given greater information on (or reminders of) penalties respond differently both in their 
compliance intentions and in their subsequent actual compliance. 
A particular advantage of the test in this context is that the ‘evaded’ outstanding tax is known 
to both the taxpayer and the revenue authority – the New Zealand Inland Revenue department 
(IRD). The probability of detection in this case can therefore reasonably be treated as unity. That 
is, the experiment can be expected to reveal pure penalty effects uncontaminated by ‘probability of 
detection’ effects, allowing us to consider the degree of support for this aspect of the ASY model. 
Among existing studies to address the role of penalties on compliance, early evidence was 
obtained mainly from lab experiments or country case-studies by Alm and various co-authors; see, 
for example, Alm et al. (1990, 1992a, b). Conclusions from this literature are perhaps best summed 
up by Alm et al. (1990) as: “individuals will increase their tax compliance if … more severe penalties 
are imposed or if detection becomes more certain. However, these responses are generally quite 
small” (p.613). 
Slemrod et al. (1995) specifically examined the timing of US tax filing, analysing why some 
taxpayers file late or early when this generates financial losses (via penalties or foregone time-related 
gains). Using a model which allows for a ‘stochastic opportunity cost’ of filing, they argue that 
unpredictable day to day shocks to the opportunity cost of taxpayers’ time can render it optimal to 
pay early or late. However the focus of the Slemrod et al (1995) model was not on whether observed 
penalty responses are consistent with an ASY interpretation, though their evidence could be 
                                                 
1 GST is New Zealand’s version of a value added tax. Unusually among OECD VAT regimes it applies to almost all 
value added at a uniform rate (currently 15%), excluding financial services (exempt) but including all government value 
added activities. 
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interpreted as taxpayers responding rationally to the joint effects of penalties and random shock to 
opportunity cost on their financial optima. 
It could be argued that an instalment repayment plan with reduced penalties, as considered below, 
is analogous to a form of tax amnesty (where owed tax and penalties are forgiven), on which there is 
also some evidence; see for example, Alm and Beck (1990, 1991, 1993), Stella (1991), Malik and 
Schwab (1991), López-Laborda and Rodrigo (2003), Alm et al. (2009) and Farrar and Hausserman 
(2016). This literature has also generally found limited responses to the offer of reduced or eliminated 
penalties. Alm et al. (2009) for example, note that: “… the actual experiences of many countries 
indicate that the immediate impact on revenues is almost always quite small.” (p. 236). Nevertheless, 
in a lab experiment setting Farrar and Hausserman (2016) find that “when taxpayers contemplate 
making a tax amnesty disclosure, desire to avoid a penalty is the most influential extrinsic motive”. 
Two recent studies have focused on late tax payment in particular. Skov (2013) examines the 
response of Danish taxpayers’ payment timing decisions to the imposition of penalties. He shows that 
the introduction of a small daily penalty for late payment of owed tax by the Danish tax authorities 
led to a 50-day advancement on average in the timing of those payments though, as he recognises, 
this outcome arises in a context of almost no ‘optimising frictions’ (Chetty, 2012). Hallsworth et al. 
(2014) examine late tax payment by UK income taxpayers, considering whether compliance can be 
encouraged via ‘social norm’ messages to taxpayers. From their UK field experiment they argue that 
‘including social norms and public goods messages in standard tax payment reminder letters 
considerably enhances tax compliance’, but they do not test formally for responses to ASY-related 
penalty messages.2 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the New Zealand GST 
penalty regime and the compliance experiment undertaken by IRD. Section 3 then considers how 
the ASY model may be adapted to capture this particular form of non-compliance and penalty 
regime. Section 4 describes our empirical framework and the experiment data. Section 5 discusses 
the results for the experiment, and section 6 concludes. 
2. The New Zealand (NZ) Penalty Regime and Experiment 
As in many OECD countries, the Goods & Service Tax (GST) – NZ’s form of value added tax 
– is an important part of the overall tax system. It is also responsible for a large fraction of late tax 
payments in New Zealand. For example, IRD data show that in July 2015 total unpaid GST 
liabilities were around $1.5 billion, representing around 25% of all unpaid tax, second only to 
personal income tax debt at around 44% of the total. GST debt was owed by 81,689 GST payers 
in July 2015: 13.2% of total registered GST payers. However, almost half (46.5%) of all registered 
GST payers had been in GST debt at some point either currently or in the past. 
IRD also groups the length of time GST payments have been overdue into three categories: 
<60 days, 60-90 days and >90 days, with the latter acknowledged as especially difficult to collect. 
Of the 13.2% of taxpayers in debt in 2015, over two-thirds (9.3%) had been in debt for longer than 
90 days, representing almost 95% of the $1.5bn. total outstanding GST liability. In short, unpaid 
                                                 
2 It could also be argued that some of their ‘social norm’ messages (such as informing late payers that they are in a non-
compliant sub-set of 10% of all taxpayers) might be interpreted by those taxpayers as an implicit ‘crime’ message due to 
being in the lower tail of the compliance distribution. 
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GST affects a large fraction of registered taxpayers and represents a large amount of outstanding 
tax liability, collection of which is a substantial non-compliance and enforcement resource issue. 
2.1 The Penalty Regime 
In common with a number of countries, the two main types of penalties levied on NZ taxpayers 
are a late filing penalty and late payment penalties. The late filing penalty is fixed as a dollar amount, 
from $50 to $500, differing by the type of tax (e.g. income tax, GST, etc.) and by some taxpayer 
characteristics (e.g. net income, accounting basis). 
Late payment penalties have two components. 
(i) An initial penalty in two stages: a 1% late payment penalty charged on the day after the due 
date and a further 4% penalty charged on amounts of tax and penalties unpaid seven days after the 
due date. Since the taxpayers considered here all have overdue tax of 60 days or more, below we 
simplify this penalty as a single 5% initial penalty, ignoring the 1/7 day distinction. 
(ii) An incremental penalty charged at 1% per month for outstanding debt including initial 
penalties. This is equivalent to approximately 12.7% per year. 
In addition, use-of-money interest (UOMI) is charged on all outstanding debt inclusive of 
penalties, with the rate varying according to market conditions. Since May 2016, this is 8.3% per 
year, reduced from a high of 14.2% in March 2007.3 
When an individual owing penalties is unwilling or unable to pay outstanding debt to IRD 
immediately, the tax authority may choose to offer an instalment arrangement to the taxpayer, or 
agree to one proposed by the taxpayer. This agreement triggers the cessation only of the incremental 
penalty, remaining in place as long as the taxpayer adheres to the instalment agreement. The initial 
5% penalty remains payable, and UOMI continues to apply to all outstanding tax including 
penalties. 
Letting  be the initial 5% penalty and f represent the incremental penalty, the effective fine rate 
for the first $ of debt (the ‘extensive margin’) is given by (1 +  + f)(1 + r) = 1.276 or 27.6%, while 
the ‘intensive’ marginal penalty rate applicable to each additional $ of debt is (1 + f)(1 + r) = 1.226 
or 22.6%. Since f = 0 when in an instalment arrangement, this reduces the effective ‘extensive’ and 
‘intensive’ penalties to 13.8% and 8.8% respectively.4 The percentage effective penalty rates are 
therefore more than halved in an instalment arrangement. 
The analysis below ignores late filing penalties, and concentrates on late payment penalties 
which were the focus of the experiment. 
2.2 The Field Experiment 
This experiment was undertaken by IRD from August to September 2014 and was part of a 
compliance ‘campaign’ or ‘intervention’ to encourage taxpayers with GST debt outstanding for 
                                                 
3 Since 1997, the rate peaked at 14.7% in 1998. These are ‘debit rates’, linked to short-term market borrowing rates, 
charged on outstanding debt to IRD. A much lower ‘credit rate’ (currently 1.6%) is paid on overpayments to IRD, 
linked to market-based short-term deposit rates. 
4 The effective marginal penalty rate in instalments exceeds the interest rate since interest continues to apply to the fixed 
penalty; i.e. (1 + r + r). 
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between 60 and 90 days to repay their debts.5 All of those indebted taxpayers had previously been 
sent at least two letters seeking repayment and which included reminders that penalties were being 
applied to overdue tax. 
From a total of over 4,400 debtors in the campaign, a stratified random sample was selected to 
enter the experiment, split into three treatment groups each of 333 or 334 taxpayers.6 The campaign 
sought to communicate with debtors by various means but those selected for treatment in the 
experiment were all targeted to receive a specific phone call to encourage them to pay their debts 
using one of three possible ‘scripts’ to open the conversation. All debtors had previously received 
at least two IRD letters or texts seeking payment and mentioning penalties. The phone call (a 
standard IRD compliance tool, for which staff are specifically trained) first requested immediate 
payment of the outstanding debt – a requirement of IRD’s code of practice. Only in the absence 
of a positive response to this request, were taxpayers in the treatment groups offered a reduced-
penalty instalment arrangement in which debt is repaid over a negotiated period, usually up to 2 
years.  
Specifically, the phone call differed between the three groups in terms of the information about 
debt-related penalties that was given to the taxpayer before offering the instalment option. In 
addition to the benefits of the delayed payment schedule via lower interest payments, the instalment 
option ‘turns off’ the incremental penalty, at 1% per month, that otherwise accumulates on 
outstanding debt. 
3. Modelling Taxpayer Choices 
As with previous late payment studies, in our context the non-compliance decision does not 
consist of under-declaring true income, as in the standard model, but relates to late payment of the 
assessed due tax. Both the taxpayer and the tax authority are aware of the tax debt outstanding, 
even if the value of that debt may not be agreed. Though this ‘evasion’ has already been detected, 
where the taxpayer perceives a probability of permanently avoiding all or part of the debt (e.g. via 
a write-off), this may be treated as analogous to the ASY model’s perceived probability of detection. 
Rather than failing to detect the full tax liability, the tax authority in this case fails to enforce it. We 
define this more formally below as a perceived ‘probability of enforcement’, . 
3.1 A Model of Late Tax Payments  
It is useful to begin with the ASY model, as summarised by Sandmo (2005), which takes gross 
income, W, as given, and considers the decision to evade some income, E, from tax, for a given 
tax rate, t, applied to declared income and a ‘penalty tax rate’, F > t, applied to evaded income if 
detected. With declared income equal to W – E, the taxpayer’s objective is to maximise utility, V, 
                                                 
5 IRD regularly undertakes compliance ‘campaigns’ as a tool to improve compliance for various taxes or tax credits. 
These campaigns target specific segments of the non-compliant taxpayer population with strategies involving, for 
example, targeted phone calls, specially designed letters, and offers to negotiate over repayment periods, etc. 
6 Selected taxpayers were stratified by filing frequency and ‘individual/non-individual’ status to reflect their shares of the 
GST payer population. As discussed below taxpayers were also stratified somewhat differently by their current and 
past debt type exposure (e.g. GST, income tax, PAYE). Indebted taxpayers were also ineligible for the experiment if 
(a) they had a tax agent (since the taxpayer would not be spoken to directly in this case); (b) the debt was generated by 
a default assessment (and hence potentially unreliable); (c) if the taxpayer’s total GST debt was over $1 million (hence 
an extreme outlier). 
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from income in two possible states – where evasion is undetected (hence net income, Y = (1 – t)W 
+ tE) and where evasion is detected (hence net income, Z = (1 – t)W –( F – t)E.) 
AS (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) show that for a risk-averse taxpayer, and where penalties are 
levied as a fraction of evaded tax, tE, rather than evaded income, then some tax evasion is optimal 
if, pF < 1, where F > 1 is the ‘penalty rate’ and FtE is the evaded tax inclusive of penalties; see 
Sandmo (2005, p.647). 7 Hence, the taxpayer prefers to evade some tax if the ‘expected penalty 
rate’, pF, is less than 1. It is this result that has generated extensive debate over the ‘puzzle’ that, 
for plausible values of p and F, it should be optimal for the vast majority of taxpayers to evade.8 
The ASY inequality above can alternatively be expressed as p < 1/F, such that the probability 
of detection is less than the inverse of the penalty rate. Following Sandmo (2005), the right–hand 
side of (1) can be interpreted as a relative price of income in the states of detection and non–
detection. The numerator of (1) is simply the ‘price’ of undetected evasion - each dollar of evaded 
tax is worth one dollar to the taxpayer, while the denominator is the price of a dollar of detected 
evasion, namely the penalty rate F > 1, giving a relative price of 1/F. 
To model the timing of tax payments once tax liability has been assessed, we consider a simple 
two period case where taxpayers have the choice of paying immediately, at time t without penalty, 
or delaying and incur penalties on the outstanding debt, at time t+1. Gemmell (2016) sets out this 
simplified two-period model of an individual taxpayer’s payment choice in more detail. We build 
on that analysis and consider a taxpayer who is already in debt (has already decided not to pay 
immediately) and is offered an instalment option, as this is the context of our experiment. 
As shown in Gemmell (2016), a taxpayer chooses to delay an outstanding debt rather than 
paying immediately when the expected cost of delaying the payment (expected fine) is lower than 
the cost of paying immediately (the borrowing rate). We define the “total effective penalty rate” as: 
 𝐹 ≡ (1 +  + 𝑓)(1 + 𝑟) > 1 (1) 
where  is the initial late payment penalty, f is the incremental late payment penalty and r is the 
interest rate applied to overdue tax payments9. The expected fine depends on the perceived 
probability of enforcement of full tax liability, and this is a subjective probability that differs across 
taxpayers. Hence it can be shown that delaying tax payment will be preferred to paying immediately 
by individual j if (analogous to the ASY inequality above): 
 𝜋𝑗𝐹 < (1 + 𝜌𝑗) (2) 
                                                 
7 As in Sandmo (2005), the ‘penalty rate’ is defined here to include both the evaded tax and the added penalties applied; 
hence F > 1. The original AS paper, and some subsequent literature, use the term ‘penalty tax rate’ which is applied 
to evaded income, given here by tF; see Sandmo (2005, pp.646-7), Gahramanov (2009) and Gemmell (2016) for 
exposition. 
8 For example if the perceived probability of detection is 0.10 (an order of magnitude suggested by various empirical 
studies), then the penalty tax rate, F, would have to exceed 10 before it becomes optimal not to evaded tax. That is, 
if the model is correct, there should be very few non-evaders; a result that seems at variance with general observation. 
However, as we show below, for the case of New Zealand’s GST debt, with F around 1.25 there appears to be no 
such ‘puzzle’. Some recent studies (e.g. Kleven et al., 2011) have also questioned the ‘puzzle’ even in the traditional 
ASY context, arguing that evasion may be much more common among those tax types where it is feasible; with 
third-party reporting, for example, effectively rendering some taxable income (such as PAYE) evasion infeasible. 
9 We abstract from inflation hence r may be thought of as a real (=nominal) interest rate. 
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where 𝜋𝑗 is taxpayer j’s perceived probability of full debt enforcement and 𝜌𝑗 is taxpayer j’s 
borrowing rate, i.e. the opportunity cost of each $ paid in tax. 
Introducing an instalment option adds two new dimensions to the payment choice problem. 
Firstly, the applicable penalty is lower but the perceived probability of enforcement of the 
instalment penalty, 𝜋𝑗
𝐼 , may differ from the perceived probability of debt enforcement with no 
instalment option. We consider two cases: a ‘benchmark’ case where 𝜋𝑗
𝐼 = 1; and 𝜋𝑗
𝐼 < 1.10 
Secondly, instalments involve a mixture of immediate and delayed payment and hence might be 
expected to reflect some of the properties of both of those payment options. 
The instalment payment option is simplified here as an agreement by the indebted taxpayer to 
pay a fraction of the late tax owed, j, at t, with (1 – j) paid at t+1. In this case, the portion delayed 
to t+1 is liable to a reduced penalty rate of: 
 𝐹𝐼 =(1 + )(1 + r) (3) 
The indebted taxpayer’s expected income under the two options (remaining in debt or agreeing to 
instalments) can be expressed as: 
 𝑍𝐷 = 𝑊 + 𝐷 − 𝜋𝑗 (
𝐹
(1+𝜌𝑗)
) 𝐷 (4) 
𝑍𝐼 = 𝑊 + (1 − 𝛼)𝐷 − 𝜋𝑗
𝐼 (
𝐹𝐼
(1+𝜌𝑗)
) (1 − 𝛼)𝐷 (5) 
where ZD and ZI are respectively expected income obtained in the debt and instalment cases 
respectively. In (4), income is simply gross income, W, plus the value of the debt less the expected 
debt (repaid) inclusive of fines if enforced, j(F/(1 + j))D. As previously, enforcement occurs in 
period t+1, hence is discounted at (1 + j). In (5), the instalment regime boosts gross income 
immediately by (1 – )D – the component of debt not paid immediately by agreement – but income 
is reduced by {(1 – )𝜋𝑗
𝐼𝐹𝐼/(1 + j)}D when the second instalment fraction is paid at t+1, if 
enforced. 
The taxpayer is indifferent between these two options where: 
 𝜋𝑗 =
𝛼
𝐹
(1 + 𝜌𝑗) + 𝜋𝑗
𝐼(1 − 𝛼)
𝐹𝐼
𝐹
 (6) 
Hence taxpayers for whom j is greater than the right-hand-side of (6) will prefer to agree to an 
instalment arrangement with its lower penalties, whereas taxpayers with j less than the right-hand-
side of (6) will prefer to remain in debt, risking subsequent enforcement. 
We illustrate the conditions under which an instalment agreement is preferred to remaining in 
debt in Figure 1.  
                                                 
10 Where taxpayers have defaulted on a previous instalment option (as occurs in our dataset), for example, it might 
be expected that their perceived probability of enforcement while in an instalment arrangement is less than one.  
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Figure 1 Late Payment and Enforcement Probabilities 
From (2), with 𝜋𝑗 on the vertical axis and (1 + 𝜌𝑗) on the horizontal axis, the line AB, with 
slope and intercept 1/F, shows points at which the taxpayer is indifferent between paying the tax 
debt immediately or delaying payment: 𝜋𝑗𝐹 = (1 + 𝜌𝑗). At 𝜋𝑗 = 1, the line segment BC becomes 
horizontal. The taxpayers that prefer to delay payment are those below the line AB and those to 
the right of point B. 
In the experiment, contacted taxpayers were first proposed to pay their outstanding debt 
immediately, and in the absence of a positive response were offered an instalment arrangement. It 
is possible that some of those taxpayers declared an intention to pay immediately. In terms of our 
model, this can be represented as an increase in the perceived probability of enforcement due to 
being directly contacted by the tax agency, moving them above the line AB.  
The line DE shows points at which equation (8) holds, for a perceived probability 𝜋𝑗
𝐼 = 1. This 
is our benchmark case where the taxpayers expects the tax authority to fully enforce debt payment 
under an instalment option. Compared to the line AB it has a higher intercept and a lower slope (
𝛼
𝐹
 
instead of 
1
𝐹
). Above the line the expected costs of delaying payment are greater than the expected 
costs of agreeing an instalment option and the taxpayers will opt for the instalment agreement. 
Indebted taxpayers that were already within the area FBCE will now prefer instalments. 
If the taxpayer does not think that the penalty will be fully enforced in the instalment option, 
i.e. 𝜋𝑗
𝐼 < 1, the intercept of the line DE decreases and the line shifts downwards. The area over 
which taxpayers previously in debt switch to instalment increases. Note that if 𝜋𝑗
𝐼 >
1
𝐹𝐼
, then the 
intercept of the line DE will always be above point A, but for 𝜋𝑗
𝐼 <
1
𝐹
, the intercept of line DE will 
be below point A.  
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If the perceived probability of enforcement under instalments is considered the same as the 
perceived probability of enforcement it can be shown that the intercept of the line DE will be 
below 1/F and its slope will increase. Hence in this case (not shown in the diagram), the area over 
which taxpayers will switch to instalments may be smaller (especially for those with higher 
borrowing rates). 
Note also that the higher the value of alpha, the greater will be the slope of the line DE, and 
hence the smaller the area of switching into instalment for high levels of borrowing rates. 
3.2 Penalty Misperceptions 
The analysis so far has assumed that the effective penalty rate, F (= 1 +  + f)(1 + r)), is known 
to taxpayers. But the New Zealand effective penalty system is relatively complex, with three 
elements (, f and r) combining multiplicatively and with the interest rate element fluctuating over 
time with market conditions; the other elements have remained fixed for several years. As a result 
there was an opportunity to discover, via the experiment, how awareness of the penalty regime 
might affect taxpayers’ willingness to resolve their indebtedness to IRD.11 
Clearly, in the absence of full information, taxpayers may under- or over-estimate penalty rates. 
However, given the large size of the effective penalty and the complexity of the regime, our null 
hypothesis is that taxpayers who lack full information on penalty rates, tend to under-estimate the 
effective penalty rate. This rate, of around 27%, is high (perhaps surprisingly high?) relative to 
private market borrowing options.12 
 In terms of Figure 1, a lower (perceived) value of F increases both the intercept and the slope 
of the line AB, which rotates anti-clockwise. 
Unsurprisingly the combinations of j and j for which immediate payment, rather than delay, 
is perceived as optimal are reduced. Hence, compared to a taxpayer who is fully informed, those 
who initially underestimated penalties but are informed of the penalty regime and offered the 
instalment penalty/payment option during the intervention are now much more likely to view the 
instalment option as optimal. 
3.3 Testable Hypotheses 
The above analysis may be summarised in a number of specific hypothesis that in principle can 
be tested with data from the tax compliance experiment.  
H1: Direct (telephone) contact by IRD, ceteris paribus, increases taxpayers’ perceived probability 
of enforcement of their tax debt, j, thereby increasing the likelihood of increased 
compliance; that is, greater willingness to agree to pay immediately, given that this was the 
initial option offered to indebted taxpayers. 
                                                 
11 See Chetty and Saez (2013) and Bhargava and Maloni (2012) for evidence of systematic misperception of tax and 
benefit rates. 
12 For example typical rates of interest on New Zealand credit cards were around 18-21%, and bank business lending 
and overdraft rates around 8-11%, at the time of the intervention. See 
http://www.interest.co.nz/borrowing/business-base-rates. 
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H2: Taxpayers with relative high borrowing costs j, and previously opting to delay tax payment, 
are more likely to accept an instalment option. This is less likely to be the case for low 
borrowing cost taxpayers and with a low perceived probability of debt enforcement. 
H3: The lower the perceived probability of enforcement to repay debt, the less likely indebted 
taxpayers will agree to comply, especially for taxpayers with relatively higher borrowing 
costs. 
H4: The lower the perceived probability of enforcement of the instalment agreement, the more likely 
taxpayers will accept it, especially for taxpayers with relatively higher borrowing costs. 
H5: For taxpayers underestimating effective penalty rates, providing more accurate information 
on existing penalties increases the probability that an instalment option (with lower 
penalties) will be chosen when offered. The immediate payment option is more likely for 
low borrowing cost taxpayers. 
H6: The higher the proportion of the tax debt to be paid as a first instalment, the lower the 
incentives to accept the instalment option, especially for those taxpayers with relatively high 
borrowing costs. 
A challenge in testing any of those hypotheses empirically is how to capture or proxy for the 
key subjective variables: the taxpayer’s perceived probabilities of enforcement, 𝜋𝑗  and 𝜋𝑗
𝐼 , and 
taxpayers’ borrowing costs, j. Nevertheless, a number of taxpayer-specific characteristics collected 
as part of the experiment can be expected to be correlated with those unobservable characteristics. 
In later sections we describe these and their potential ability to capture the effects of interest. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Selecting Treatment and Non-treatment Groups 
In June 2014, New Zealand Inland Revenue (IRD) selected taxpayers with Goods & Service 
Tax (GST) liabilities unpaid between 60 and 90 days after the due date, for an intervention 
campaign seeking improved compliance via payment of outstanding GST debt. Of the total 60-90 
day GST debtor population of 4,403, 2,498 remained in GST debt when the intervention began to 
target debtors in August 2014. Of the 4,403 total, over half (2,512; 57%) had some other form of 
concurrent debt to IRD, such as income tax debt (which faces a similar penalty regime to GST), 
family tax credit debt, employer debt etc. Such taxpayers might be expected to have some awareness 
that penalties and interest are applied to their current GST debts.13 In addition, all indebted 
taxpayers in the experiment had previously been sent letters or other communications that included 
reminders that “penalties and interest” are applied to unpaid tax. Some debtors were ‘first time 
debtors’ for GST (i.e. they had no previous record of late payment) while others had several past 
records of late or non-payment. 
From the original total of 4,403 debtor population, three samples each of 333 or 334 taxpayers 
were randomly selected for treatment and given different penalty/instalment information (labelled 
                                                 
13 The telephone calls used in the intervention sought, at the end of the call, to obtain qualitative information on each 
respondent’s prior knowledge of penalties before the call. However, this was not coded, is not readily quantifiable, and 
may be unreliable given that (except for Group A) penalties were discussed earlier in the phone conversation. 
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groups A, B and C below), with the remaining group receiving a ‘business as usual’ compliance 
intervention.14 However prior to random selection, debtors were stratified according to their debt 
type/history as shown in Table 1. This stratification was chosen for IRD operational reasons (e.g. 
to focus attention on particular debtor characteristics of interest, such that the ‘treated’ included all 
taxpayers with both income tax and GST debt). Of course, this interferes with the random selection 
design, potentially limiting its usefulness as a random field experiment. Our analysis therefore 
proceeds by first identifying the relevant stratified taxpayer groups in Table 1, lines 1 – 5. 
Table 1: GST Late Payment Debtors by Debt Type and History 
 Not 
treated 
Treatment groups: 
TOTAL  
 A B C 
1. Total debt > $50k 49 - - - 49 
2. GST debt only/no previous - 90 107 103 300 
3. GST debt only/previous 940 222 208 208 1,578 
4. GST & Income tax debt - 21 18 22 61 
5. GST & Other debt 2,415 - - - 2,415 
6. TOTAL 3,404 333 333 333 4,403 
Line 2 shows that all of those with only GST debt, but no previous GST debt record, were 
selected for treatment in the intervention. A similar selection applied to the small sub-sample with 
both GST and income tax debt (line 4). A relatively small number of GST payers with especially 
large total debts (>$50,000) were also excluded from the treatment groups. We therefore focus our 
analysis on the 1,578 debtors in the “GST debt only, with previous GST debts” sub-sample (line 
3) since their allocation was random without pre-selection. This also has the advantages of being a 
more homogeneous sub-sample and, having a history of GST debt, all have previous experience 
of the penalty regime. On the other hand, with a history of GST debt, they may be a more difficult 
group to induce to comply.  
As noted earlier, treatment groups A, B and C were selected to receive different information on 
late payment penalties at the opening of the phone conversation. Group A received no penalty 
information before being offered an instalment arrangement (hence the instalment penalty 
discount was also not mentioned). Group B was first asked “did you know that you are being charged 
penalties on your debt to IR?”, before being told that if an instalment arrangement is entered into: “we’ll 
stop your penalties”. Groups C faced a similar conversation but received quantitative penalty 
information “… If you enter into an instalment arrangement, we’ll stop penalties of 1% per month from 
applying”.15 
Of most interest in the empirical analysis are groups A and C since these represent the two 
extremes of initiating the conversation with no penalty information, and with precise quantitative 
                                                 
14 An additional 30 taxpayers with 60-90 day GST debt were separately selected by IRD to receive no contact during the 
campaign. These taxpayers are excluded from all of the analyses here. 
15 Phone conversations with taxpayers can, of course, be unpredictable, which will affect their classification in the 
experiment. For example, the scripting for Group A required that aspects of penalties were not mentioned until the 
customer agreed to an instalment arrangement. But taxpayers may ask questions about penalties (directly or indirectly) 
before that point.  In such case IR staff were required to answer the question, which then required the removal of the 
taxpayer from the relevant (A, B or C) group. A taxpayer was also removed from the experiment if they indicated that 
their GST payment is taken care of by their tax agent. 
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penalty information. Group B represents a less specific ‘intermediate’ penalty information set. The 
non-treatment group – the remaining debtors in the campaign – were also subject to increased 
compliance effort. However, they were not subjected to the same intensity of phone calls (to 
achieve contact) and were not necessarily offered an instalment arrangement. Also, some 
independently initiated contact with IRD during the campaign, and ‘non-treated’ conversations 
with IRD were not scripted to link penalty information directly with an instalment offer. Many 
within this non-treatment group were not successfully contacted by IRD during the campaign and 
hence provide a large group of ‘no response’ debtors that serve as a convenient default group in 
our multinomial logit analysis. 
4.2 Taxpayer Responses and Characteristics Data 
We have information on the following taxpayer responses and characteristics: 
1. Taxpayers’ initial phone responses on their intention to repay debt, obtained during the 
experiment’s conversations (in August-September 2014). Responses were classified as follows: 
a) Immediate payment agreed 
b) Instalment arrangement set-up agreed (documentation to be sent to taxpayer) 
c) Postponement of decision agreed pending further communication (penalties continue) 
d) Miscellaneous, including unclassifiable responses  
e) No response (failed to contact &/or obtain response) 
f) Not in debt (identified as debt cleared during the campaign) 
The miscellaneous category represents a number of hard-to-classify responses including those 
in the treatment groups where the phone conversation proceeded in ways that prevented a clear A, 
B or C coding. ‘No response’ captures taxpayers with whom no successful contact was established 
or who were successfully contacted but from whom no response could be obtained. For the 
purposes of our analysis we amalgamate categories c) and d) and label as “other”. The ‘not in debt’ 
category are taxpayers who cleared their debt by the time the intervention succeeded in making 
contact with them. Since the campaign lasted approximately 2 months, numerous taxpayers paid 
off their debt before receiving the campaign phone call. 16 In our empirical logit analysis below this 
group provide an interesting sub-sample because their payment behaviour might reasonably be 
regarded as not influenced by the intervention. Relative those who were not successfully contacted 
and who did not subsequently pay their overdue tax, the former group might be expected to display 
fewer non-compliance characteristics. 
2. Taxpayers’ actual debt repayment responses (as coded by IRD) six months after the end of the 
experiment in March 2015. These observed outcomes were classified as follows:  
(i) Immediate (within 1 month) full payment agreement is in place. 
(ii) Instalment arrangement is in place. 
(iii) Auto-seizure action in place (i.e. following failure to obtain a voluntarily agreement, IRD 
is auto-seizing payment from the taxpayer’s employer or bank accounts. 
                                                 
16 In addition a small number of taxpayers (57), indebted at the time of selection for the experiment (in May/June 2014), 
were no longer indebted when the intervention began in August 2014, leaving a sample of 1,521 observations. The 
included ‘no longer in debt’ category refers to those who paid their GST debt during the period of the intervention but 
prior to being contacted by phone. 
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(iv) Case Open: the case is unresolved – the taxpayer is considered to be ‘non-compliant’. 
(v) Other Action. 
‘Other action’ includes cases for which debt was either cleared, or subject to an agreement to delay 
(e.g. due to a ‘grace period’, or ‘hardship’; hence the taxpayer is considered as ‘compliant’) or there 
was on-going negotiation. 
In addition, data were collected on several relevant taxpayer characteristics at the time of the 
intervention including levels of tax indebtedness, indicators of precious non-compliance, and other 
taxpayer-specific characteristics. There are listed in Table 2. Some descriptive statistics on taxpayer 
characteristics for treated and non-treated groups are given in the Appendix. 
Table 2 Taxpayer Characteristics 
Characteristic Variables available 
Taxpayer 
indebtedness 
 Amount of current (60-90 day old) GST debt classified into five ($) 
categories: 500; 500-1k; 1-5k; 5-10k, 10-50k. 
 Value of total tax debt at the time of the campaign including any debt 
accumulated from previous tax years. 
Previous 
non-compliance 
 Number of previous debt episodes. 
 Number of tax returns outstanding at the time of the intervention. 
 Number of times taxpayer has defaulted on an instalment agreement. 
 Value and number of previous debt write-offs. 
Taxpayer contact  Number of attempts by IRD to contact taxpayer during intervention. 
Firm characteristics  Taxpayer ‘type’: individual, company, partnership, trust, Maori 
Authority, society/club.17 
 Number of employees.  
 Total sales and income declared for the fiscal year 2013/14. 
 Total purchases and expenses declared for the fiscal year 2013/14. 
 Net profit and ‘standardised’ net profit for the fiscal year 2013/14.18 
 Filing frequency of GST returns (1, 2 or 6 monthly). 
 Nature of business/industry: 2-digit ANZSIC code. 
 
4.3 Testing Compliance Hypotheses with Available Variables 
The ASY model adapted in section 3 suggests that the taxpayer-specific perceived enforcement 
probabilities (𝜋𝑗
𝐼 , 𝜋𝑗), and borrowing costs, j, are expected to impact late payment/debt repayment 
choices in a number of ways. These subjective variables are directly unobservable but might be 
expected to be correlated with some of our variables available in our dataset. 
For example, current debt levels should be correlated with the borrowing cost (j) of delayed 
payments, since greater amounts of debt might be expected to be associated with higher borrowing 
costs to repay the debt. This includes both a ‘volume effect’ (a higher amount borrowed is required) 
and a ‘price effect’ where larger amounts borrowed imply greater risk; hence a higher interest rate 
on loans. We therefore expect lower compliance – less likelihood of agreeing to repay debt – the 
larger is the amount of current debt. 
                                                 
17 A Māori authorities acts as a trust or company administering communally owned Māori property. 
18 Firms’ profits are standardisation using the relevant industry mean and standard deviation. 
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Taxpayers’ previous non-compliance behaviour should be correlated with their perceived 
probability of debt enforcement, j. Previous experience of non-compliance can be expected to 
give such taxpayers greater awareness that j. < 1. Hence the greater is previous non-compliance 
(e.g. more often in debt, greater the number of tax returns outstanding) the less likely is the 
individual to respond to an intervention with increased compliance in the form of immediate 
repayment or instalments. In addition greater numbers of contact attempts by IRD (before 
successfully making contact or failing) typically indicate that such taxpayers are harder to get hold 
of. Less compliant taxpayers, who are aware that avoiding/delaying contact reduces j, can be 
expected to be disproportionately represented in this group.  
Similarly, taxpayers who have previously experienced more and/or higher valued debt write-
offs conceded by IRD can be expected to have lower perceived probabilities of debt enforcement 
and hence are less likely to respond to the intervention with increased compliance. 
Previous defaults on instalment agreements could affect the perceived probability of 
enforcement when in an instalment arrangement (𝜋𝑗
𝐼 < 1). In line with the discussion proposed in 
section 3 we expect that the greater the number of previous defaults on instalment agreements, the 
more likely is a taxpayer to accept an instalment option in this case. 
For firms’ characteristics, we generally do not have a priori sign predictions of their effect on 
compliance, but we nevertheless consider them as potentially important observable firm-level 
controls that can affect compliance. For example, compliance more generally is often alleged to 
differ by industry with some evidence that small construction sector firms, or industries dominated 
be self-employment entities, for example, are less compliant. Firm size measures (e.g. number of 
employees, earnings, profit size etc.) might be expected to be correlated with compliance if, for 
example, larger or more profitable firms face lower borrowing costs (via lower risk). Additionally 
they may be more able to reduce j through resistance to enforcement efforts (e.g. via negotiations 
or legal procedures with IRD). 
For industrial sectors, in the regressions we control separately for the four industries where our 
sample is concentrated (46% of taxpayers): Construction (16.4%), Property Operators & Real 
Estate Services (13.8%) Professional, Scientific & Technical Services (8.3%), and Agriculture 
(7.7%). 
4.4 Empirical Specification 
To examine the role of the intervention and compliance-related factors discussed above, we 
examine separately the taxpayer’s declared response during the experiment, and recorded response 
six months later. Hence our dependent variables are declared intention and actual behaviour six months 
after the period of the intervention. We group declared intentions into the five categories listed as 
a) to e) above, noting that c) and d) are combined. These are labelled as: ‘Pay Now’, ‘Instalments’, 
‘Other’, ‘No response’ and ‘Not in debt’. We use ‘No response’ as the base/default category in our 
analysis; all other declared intention categories are measured relative to this default. 
We use a multinomial logistic regression model to estimate response probabilities for the five 
categories above of declared intention using the following four equations: 
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TreatA, TreatB and TreatC are dummy variables for treatment groups A, B and C respectively 
(the ‘business as usual’ group being the reference category), X is a set of control variables as 
described above, and the ’s are regression coefficients. We apply the same model to the analysis 
of actual behaviour, for which we consider the five categories above, namely: Pay now, Instalments, 
Auto-seizure, Case open and Other. Case open is our base category.  
By exponentiating the linear equations in (R1-R4) we obtain the ratio of the probability of 
intention to ‘pay now’ (or enter instalments, etc.) to the probability of ‘no response’. These are the 
relative risk (odds) ratios, RRRs, shown in the tables below which provide a more straightforward 
interpretation. A relative risk ratio greater (less) than one implies that the likelihood of the relevant 
category under consideration is larger (smaller) than the likelihood of the base case. In addition the 
relative size of RRRs across variables and specifications indicate the relative sizes of the relevant 
responses. 
5. Experiment Results 
5.1 Declared Intentions 
Evidence on declared intentions is presented in Table 3, showing results for two categories of 
intentions to repay/comply (Pay Now and Instalments) relative to the base category No Response 
(the least compliant).  
We also include results for the category, Not in Debt. Obviously we do not expect any positive 
compliance effect of the experiment on this category since those taxpayers repaid their debt before 
they were contacted during the intervention. Nevertheless it is interesting to consider whether the 
‘early’ repayment of debt by this group without the additional IRD effort is associated with 
particular taxpayer characteristics such as previous non-compliance, number of IRD contact 
attempts during the intervention, or whether some particular firm characteristics are associated 
with the likelihood of being in this early debt repayment category. Within our sample these 
represent the least non-compliant, at least in terms of the length of their payment delay. 
Table 3 shows results for three specifications: specification 1 includes only the three treatment 
group dummy variables; specification 2 includes debt-related control variables, while specification 
3 adds further firm characteristics. In each specification, asterisks associated with RRRs and 
standard errors in Tables 3 and 4 indicate where RRRs are statistically significantly different from 
one, not zero. 
All three specifications show that treatments B and C have a positive impact on the Pay Now 
probability, statistically significant for 5 of the 6 estimated parameters: that is, the likelihood of the 
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taxpayer responding with an intention to pay immediately, relative to the likelihood of no response, 
is higher (RRR > 1) for taxpayers in treatments B and C who received penalty 
information/reminders. A positive effect (with lower point estimates) is also obtained for treatment 
group A (RRR > 1), but these are not statistically significant. 
Positive effects (RRR > 1) in the treatment groups are also observed for the probability of 
agreeing to an instalment arrangement, but these are not statistically significant and estimated RRRs 
are generally lower than for the equivalent Pay Now cases across the three specifications. These 
results therefore suggest that, other things equal, the experimental intervention specifically targeted 
by IRD at groups A, B and C, succeeded in eliciting a greater intention to comply with payment of late 
GST liabilities, relative to non-contacted taxpayers. However, this effect appears to be associated 
most robustly with intentions to pay immediately (within a month) rather than to agree an 
instalment plan. Specifically with respect to penalty information given in the experiment, this 
appears to have had some effect on stated intentions to comply when mentioned to taxpayers 
(groups B and C), compared to those for whom no prior penalty reminders were given (group A). 
In discussing the impact of control variables on payment intentions we concentrate on 
specification 3 which includes all controls; results are very similar for control variables that appear 
in both specifications 2 and 3. 
Table 3 suggests that the size of taxpayers’ total debt negatively affects compliance, as expected.  
Before interpreting this result, recall that this sample of taxpayers only have GST debt. Therefore 
their total debt in this case is all GST of whatever vintage (outstanding for <60 days, 60-90 days, 
>90 days), whereas the intervention related specifically to the 60-90 GST debt component. The 
results in Table 3 however indicate that all three taxpayer intention categories which signal greater 
compliance (Pay Now, Instalments and Not in Debt) are less likely if taxpayers have greater total 
(GST) debt. We suggested earlier that such high-debt taxpayers can be expected to face higher 
costs of borrowing from the private sector (higher j) to repay tax debt. If so, ceteris paribus, they are 
thus less likely (than those with lower debt) to respond to the intervention by increasing 
compliance. 
For a given size of total GST debt, higher ‘60-90day’ GST debt is expected to encourage greater 
compliance. This may be due to the 60-90 day specific intervention raising j for this debt element, 
such that taxpayers prefer to pay off this debt rather than other tax debt they hold, and/or because 
the offer of a reduced instalment penalty for this GST element has greatest benefit when this 
element is large. As expected, Table 3 results indicate that taxpayers with greater ‘60-90 day’ GST 
debt are associated with being more likely to intend to enter an instalment agreement: the RRR 
estimates increase with the five debt size bands and are statistically significant. However, there is 
no significant effect on the declared intention to pay immediately. This is consistent with the 
reduced penalty being a primary motivator for the increased compliance by high ‘60-90 day’ GST 
debtors. 
More puzzling is the Table 3 result for those Not in Debt, indicating that especially large ‘60-90 
day’ GST debts (>$5,000) are associated with a greater likelihood of the taxpayer being in this 
relatively compliant category – having paid off their late payment debt without the added incentive 
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of the intervention.19 For those taxpayers a potential increase in j via the intervention is irrelevant, 
and they did not receive an offer of an instalment arrangement for this debt. One possible reason 
for this result is that, with total GST debt held constant in those regressions, this variable indicates 
where a larger fraction of that debt is of the ‘60-90 day’ form. Hence the observation that where 
this fraction is high, a Not in Debt outcome is more likely may simply indicate that paying off this 
debt element held for a relatively short period (and hence subject to smaller penalties) involves 
lower costs for those taxpayers than paying off the more costly and prevalent ‘>90 day’ GST debt. 
Next we consider the impact of the taxpayer’s previous record of non-compliance on their debt 
repayment intentions. Of the five variables listed in Table 2, we find statistically significant effects 
associated with two of them.20 Specifically, as expected a larger number of tax returns outstanding 
(not submitted to IRD), is associated with a negative impact on compliance: the greater the number 
of returns outstanding the less likely is a taxpayer to indicate an intention to pursue all of the three 
more compliant options: Pay now, Instalment, or Not in Debt, relative to the no response case. 
Secondly, confirming our expectations, taxpayers with a greater number of previous defaults on 
an instalment agreement are statistically more likely to indicate an intention to enter an instalment 
agreement during the experiment, whilst reducing the likelihood of paying now (and Not in Debt 
– though the latter RRRs are not significantly different from one). It seems likely that this past 
experience of instalment defaulting by the taxpayer gives them knowledge of the system that 
effectively reduced their perceived probability of enforcement of such instalment arrangements, 
hence inducing participation in instalments, largely at the expense of immediate repayment. 
Finally, other firm characteristics in general are at most weakly associated with differences in 
declared intentions by the taxpayer. None is statistically significant for Instalment intentions. For 
Pay Now intentions, less frequent filing has a negative effect, while taxpayers in two specific 
economic sectors (Construction, and Professional, Scientific & Technical Services) appear more 
likely to respond with intentions to pay immediately. There is also some evidence that firms with a 
higher standardized net profit (relative to others in their industry) are more likely to have paid their 
tax debt early (Not in Debt). If, as is often argued, internal sources of funds are cheaper to the firm 
than externally borrowed funds, this may indicate that firm-specific debt repayment costs are lower 
(lower i) when firms are more profitable. 
5.2 Actual Debt Repayment Responses 
Table 4 show the results for actual debt repayment behaviour, as recorded by the IRD six 
months after the end of the intervention, using the same three logit model specifications – with 
only the treatment groups (A, B, C) included in specification 1 and control variables introduced in 
specifications 2 and 3. Results are reported for three outcomes: Pay now, Instalments and Auto-
seizure. While the former two represent increased compliance relative to the ‘No response’ 
                                                 
19 Note that for those taxpayers, this is not a compliance intention, but actual compliance since their GST debts have 
already been paid. 
20 The three variable that are generally statistically insignificant are the number of times a taxpayer has previously been 
in debt and the number and amount of past debt write-offs obtained, though there is some evidence in Table 3 that 
a greater number of past write-offs is associated with lower compliance intentions. Since taxpayers who file more 
often (e.g. monthly rather than 2- or 6-monthly) can have a much higher number of recorded ‘episodes’ of non-
compliance or debt, and hence number of write-offs, it is possible that controlling for the filing frequency limits the 
regression impact of those non-compliance variables. We tested this with our data and found results did not change. 
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category, auto-seizure represents relatively extreme non-compliance with IRD forced to sequester 
payment from the taxpayer’s bank.21 Comparing with results in Table 3 there is a clear difference 
between taxpayers’ declared compliance intentions in response to the intervention and their 
subsequently observed compliance responses. 
For example, being in one of the three experiment treatment groups (receiving different penalty 
information and reduced instalment penalties) appears to have no statistically significant effect 
either on the probability that a taxpayer entered an instalment arrangement, or on immediate debt 
repayment. Hence it would seem that any effect that the intervention’s penalty information 
differences had on taxpayers’ declared intentions to repay debts immediately, were not realised six 
months later. 
Only for Auto-seizure is there evidence of significantly different effects on the treated (A, B, C) 
compared to the non-treated. For all three treatment groups, auto-seizure is less likely compared 
to the default of ‘no action’ (Case still open). This is consistent with the intervention succeeding in 
reducing the probability that a taxpayer is in the least compliant category (those subjected to auto-
seizure). However, it may simply indicate that the IRD was less likely to pursue the auto-seizure 
option for the taxpayers who were in the experiment than for the non-treated group, though there 
was no explicit intention by IRD to differentiate between treated and no-treated taxpayer after the 
experiment. 
The evidence on these, at most limited, actual responses by the treatment groups suggests a 
number of possible interpretations of the earlier evidence on taxpayers’ declared intentions during 
the experiment. Firstly, we might interpret taxpayer initial responses as a framing effect. That is, 
presenting taxpayers with new or repeated information on penalties generated a genuine but 
temporary intention to improve compliance and repay outstanding debt. However, for whatever 
reasons (e.g. procrastination, subsequent changes to their information sets) they failed to act 
consistent with increased compliance.  
Secondly, treated taxpayers’ initial stated intentions to improve compliance during the 
experiment may have been a strategic response, for example to delay further any IRD action such as 
auto-seizure. If so, in the case of auto-seizure it appears to have been successful. Thirdly, this 
intervention involved a two-way conversation, as opposed to a letter received by the taxpayer which 
could be ignored. Taxpayers may therefore have felt some pressure to respond positively when 
contacted personally by an IRD compliance team member, even if they intended subsequently to 
ignore any commitments made – consistent with the way these taxpayers had responded to 
previous written communications from IRD. 
Notwithstanding limited ‘treatment effects’ associated with penalties on actual compliance, does 
the evidence from control variables confirm any taxpayer-specific characteristics are associated 
with actual compliance behaviour? 
For taxpayers who entered an instalment agreement, only one control variable appears to be 
statistically significant for this choice: the number of returns outstanding is associated with a 
                                                 
21 Auto-seizure of tax debt out of employee wages, via employers, is also used though in the case of GST debt this less 
commonplace since most GST payers are either unincorporated sole traders or partnerships, or corporations. 
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negative effect (lower odds ratio) on Instalments (see specification 3). This at least is a plausible 
outcome – regularly non-compliant taxpayers (who persistently fail to file GST returns) are 
relatively unlikely to agree an instalment arrangement on their current GST debt in response to the 
intervention. 
Of course, six months after the experiment, many of the indebted taxpayers have paid off the 
60-90 day GST debt that was the focus of the intervention and are therefore recorded in the (actual) 
‘Pay Now’ category.22 
Table 4 indicates that a number of taxpayer characteristics increase or reduce the likelihood of 
paying their GST debt. Characteristics which (statistically) lower the probability of payment include: 
(i) larger 60-90 day GST debt levels; 
(ii) larger numbers of outstanding tax returns; 
(iii) more defaults on past instalment arrangements; and  
(iv) more attempts to contact the taxpayer were required in the campaign.23 
Characteristics (i) – (iii) suggest plausibly that a poorer compliance record is likely to be 
associated with a lower probability that the taxpayer will respond positively to this compliance 
intervention. Characteristic (iv) is consistent with taxpayers who are more difficult to contact 
(perhaps by intention) also likely to be less compliant.24 Both of these effects are consistent with 
the predictions from the model described earlier. 
5.3 Are the Hypotheses Supported? 
Section 3 suggested a number of hypotheses that could, in principle, be tested with data such as 
that produced by our field experiment. These hypotheses relate to the expected increase in 
compliance by already indebted taxpayers; that is, those already in the sub-set of taxpayers who are 
‘evading’ – in this case, paying late and incurring debt. This increased compliance may occur either 
through agreeing immediate debt repayment or acceptance of an offer of an instalment agreement 
involving lower penalties. 
Table 5 summarises the six hypotheses and considers whether they are supported by our 
evidence based on (a) taxpayers stated intentions during the experiment; and (b) actual compliance 
outcomes after the end of it. Since these hypotheses typically relate to directly unobservable 
variables such as perceived probabilities and penalty rates, the ‘comments’ column in the table 
identifies the relevant proxy variables from our empirical results. 
It can be seen that, with the exception of H6 – which cannot be tested with our available data 
– there is some support for each hypothesis from taxpayers’ response intentions. Based on actual 
                                                 
22 Out of a total of 179 taxpayers observed in the (actual) Pay Now category, 28 declared an intention to enter an 
instalment agreement and 46 declared an intention to Pay Now. However, since over half of the total observations (787 
out of 1,521) are in the ‘other’ actual category (i.e. their actual outcome is unresolved in some respect), it is possible that 
the limited evidence of actual compliance effects in Table 4 is partly attributable to the low number of observations 
whose outcomes could be analysed. 
23 The table also indicates that taxpayers who have been in debt more often in the past are statistically, but counter-
intuitively, more likely to Pay Now. However with an odds ratio very close to one (1.062), any positive effect, if it 
exists, is very small. 
24 When unable to reach a specific taxpayer by phone, IRD will typically leave a message; hence non-compliant 
taxpayers will often be aware of the attempted contact. 
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improvements to compliance following the experiment there is also support for hypothesis H3. 
These is some, more limited, support for H1 and H5 based on evidence for some of the least 
compliant taxpayers in the sample (those whose tax debt was auto-seized by the revenue authority). 
H2 – that taxpayers with relative high borrowing costs are more likely to accept an instalment 
option – is not supported by actual data. 
However, as Figure 1 shows, taxpayers with relatively high borrowing costs are expected to shift 
to immediate payment if the increase in their probability of enforcement due to the intervention is 
sufficiently large. Our field experiment outcomes provide some support for such a response, with 
more indebted taxpayers more likely to have paid off their debt. In this sense, a proxy for higher 
borrowing costs is associated with increased compliance following the intervention. 
 
Table 5 Compliance Hypotheses and Field Experiment Outcomes 
H1: Intervention (contact) raises compliance via increased perceived probability of enforcement 
Response 
type 
Is hypothesis 
supported? 
Comments: 
(a) Intention Yes Treated groups (A, B, C) more compliant 
(b) Actual No (Yes) (H1 supported for least compliant: auto-seizure) 
H2: Taxpayers with relative high borrowing costs more likely to accept an instalment option 
(a) Intention Yes Higher borrowing costs proxied by higher debt levels  
(b) Actual No 
But higher debt levels are associated with greater 
immediate repayment 
H3: Taxpayers with lower perceived probability of enforcement are less likely comply 
(a) Intention Yes Probability (𝜋𝑗) proxied by no. of outstanding 
returns; no. of IRD contact attempts (b) Actual Yes 
H4: Taxpayers with lower the perceived probability of enforcement of instalment agreement more likely to comply 
via instalments 
(a) Intention Yes Probability (𝜋𝑗
𝐼) proxied by no. of previous instalment 
defaults (b) Actual No 
H5: If taxpayers underestimate penalty rates, providing more accurate penalty information increases the probability 
that instalment, and immediate payment, options are chosen 
(a) Intention Yes Greater compliance by treatment groups B & C 
(b) Actual No (Yes?) 
No greater compliance by B & C (but less auto-
seizure for B & C) 
H6: The higher the proportion of the tax debt repaid as a first instalment, the lower the probability the instalment 
option is chosen 
(a) & (b) Unable to test  No data available on instalment scheduling 
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6. Conclusions 
The ‘standard’ model of tax evasion predicts effects on the extent of evasion which depend on 
the perceived probability of detection, the tax rate and the penalties for evasion. Despite 
considerable evidence on the standard model of evasion in general, as Slemrod (2007) noted, there 
is relatively little evidence specifically on the role of penalties, though the literature on tax amnesties 
provides some evidence on a form of penalty reduction for evaders. 
Using a field experiment involving New Zealand taxpayers’ late Goods and Service Tax (GST) 
payments, this paper has sought to provide evidence on the effects of late payment penalties on 
tax compliance. We argued that the ASY model can be applied to the late payment context by 
adapting it to allow for less than full enforcement of discovered evasion. It was shown that in the 
late payment case, the standard ASY result that evasion is optimal if the taxpayer’s expected penalty 
is less than one (𝑝𝑗𝐹 < 1; where 𝑝𝑗 is the probability of detection and 𝐹 is the ‘penalty rate’),
25 
simply becomes: 𝜋𝑗𝐹 < (1 + 𝜌𝑗), where 𝜋𝑗 is the probability of enforcement and 𝜌𝑗 is the taxpayer’s 
cost of borrowing (from the private sector) to pay overdue tax. 
In testing the model using our field experiment data we sought to capture empirical proxies for 
the taxpayer-specific (and hard-to-observe) variables, 𝜋𝑗 and 𝜌𝑗 . In addition, especially in the 
context of New Zealand’s complex and relatively high penalty regime, we recognise that taxpayer 
awareness of the penalty rate, F, may vary, causing responses to penalties to be conditioned by the 
degree of awareness or salience of the penalty rate. 
Our experiment involved a specific compliance intervention targeted at a random sample of 
around 1,500 GST payers with late payment debt owed to New Zealand’s Inland Revenue 
department (IRD). Selected taxpayers were contacted by phone to encourage debt repayment. 
Three treatment sub-groups were provided with differing degrees of information about the penalty 
rates applicable to their debt, and (where relevant) offered a reduced penalty rate if they entered an 
agreement to repay outstanding debt by instalments. Coding of taxpayers’ immediate responses 
allowed us to test for the impact of the intervention on intentions to pay tax. In addition, data 
collected after the intervention provided information on actual compliance responses. 
Our empirical results suggest that differences in penalty information given to taxpayers, and 
reductions in penalty rates, both affect taxpayers stated intentions to comply (pay overdue tax and 
penalties) as predicted. For example, taxpayers given more specific information about penalties are 
more likely to agree to pay their tax debt immediately or to enter an instalment agreement. They 
are also more likely to select the instalment option where our proxies for their cost of borrowing 
are greater, as the adapted ASY model predicts. Likewise, a record of greater defaulting on past 
instalment agreements (which we hypothesised reduces their perceived probability of enforcement 
for this specific arrangement) increased their likelihood of intending to adopt this option. 
Analysing subsequently observed responses, however, generally suggested that taxpayers were 
unresponsive to penalties. Results indicated that the treatment groups, whether receiving penalty 
information or not, were no more or less likely to have increased their compliance (via full payment 
or an instalment agreement) than the non-treated. Nevertheless, a number of individual taxpayer 
characteristics associated with their perceived probabilities of enforcement or cost of borrowing 
                                                 
25 The ‘penalty rate’ here is defined here such that F > 1 and the ‘penalty rate of tax’ (for the detected non-compliant) is 
Ft; see section 3. 
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were identifiable as affecting observed compliance by fully repaying debt. Thus for example, 
taxpayers with larger GST debt levels, or with a worse previous non-compliance record (greater 
numbers of outstanding tax returns), were found to be less likely to have become compliant by 
repaying their GST debt. 
Finally, the results suggested some differences between taxpayers’ stated intentions to comply 
and their subsequently observed compliance. We noted earlier that this might partly reflect the 
smaller numbers of taxpayers for whom actual outcomes were suitably resolved at the six month 
deadline when this was assessed. Nevertheless, if these intention-actual differences are genuine, at 
least two possible interpretations are possible (but which the field experiment, by its design, cannot 
resolve). 
Firstly, it may be that the telephone intervention (both in general and the specific presentation 
of penalty information) generated a framing effect whereby taxpayers were induced to respond as 
predicted by increasing their intention to comply. But this effect on attitudes was temporary so that 
taxpayers failed to follow through on their intentions. 
Secondly, taxpayers may have behaved strategically when faced with a person-to-person 
discussion with the tax authority over their tax debt. Specifically, they may have sought to gain 
further delay in repaying debt (hence delaying additional sanctions such as auto-seizure) by verbally 
agreeing to the tax authority’s suggested repayment options, even if they had little or no intention 
of implementing those agreements. 
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Table 3 Multinomial Logit Results for Declared intentions 
  
Table X:  Multinomial logit analysis for Declared intentions at the time of the experiment. Relative Risk Ratios. Baseline category: No Response (non compliance)
VARIABLES
Instalment 
Odds Ratios
PayNow 
Odds Ratios
Not in Debt 
Odds Ratios
Instalment 
Odds Ratios
PayNow 
Odds Ratios
Not in Debt 
Odds Ratios
Instalment 
Odds Ratios
PayNow 
Odds Ratios
Not in Debt 
Odds Ratios
Treatment  (BAU as default category)
Treatment A 0.927 1.336 0.482*** 1.223 1.405 0.505** 1.242 1.409 0.507**
(0.204) (0.372) (0.128) (0.292) (0.402) (0.137) (0.298) (0.408) (0.138)
Treatment B 1.014 1.599 0.575** 1.282 1.749* 0.621* 1.265 1.800** 0.616*
(0.239) (0.462) (0.159) (0.326) (0.517) (0.175) (0.323) (0.538) (0.174)
Treatment C 1.302 2.156*** 0.781 1.462 2.088** 0.795 1.467 2.104** 0.788
(0.309) (0.612) (0.211) (0.375) (0.607) (0.219) (0.379) (0.621) (0.219)
log_TOTAL_GST DEBT (current and past debt) 0.676*** 0.695*** 0.726*** 0.685*** 0.704*** 0.730***
Dummy variables for classes of current debt (default 
category: debt less or equal to $500 ) (0.0655) (0.0794) (0.0725) (0.0669) (0.0816) (0.0735)
60/90 days old GST debt (between $500-$1,000) 3.624*** 1.106 0.954 3.580*** 1.039 0.941
(1.057) (0.351) (0.265) (1.051) (0.335) (0.265)
60/90 days old GST debt (between $1,000-$5,000) 4.407*** 1.063 1.295 4.189*** 1.019 1.295
(1.363) (0.366) (0.379) (1.304) (0.358) (0.384)
60/90 days old GST debt (between$5,000-$10,000) 10.42*** 2.206 3.285*** 9.908*** 2.130 3.163**
(4.753) (1.237) (1.477) (4.533) (1.207) (1.432)
60/90 days old GST debt (between $10,000-$50,000) 13.17*** 2.676 2.894* 12.72*** 2.429 2.778*
(7.397) (1.902) (1.697) (7.204) (1.752) (1.649)
How many times in debt 1.001 1.004 1.023 1.000 1.008 1.016
(0.0146) (0.0188) (0.0145) (0.0149) (0.0191) (0.0149)
No. of tax returns outstanding at the time of the campaign 0.820*** 0.750** 0.752*** 0.826*** 0.734*** 0.752***
(0.0567) (0.0895) (0.0680) (0.0576) (0.0875) (0.0680)
No. of defaults on instalment agreement 1.734*** 0.510 0.719 1.757*** 0.483 0.741
(0.257) (0.233) (0.189) (0.267) (0.224) (0.195)
No. of write offs applied to a taxpayer 0.977 0.968 0.979 0.976 0.962* 0.982
(0.0145) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0149) (0.0192) (0.0198)
Amount of  write offs applied to a taxpayer 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(8.93e-06) (1.06e-05) (2.53e-05) (9.07e-06) (9.92e-06) (2.62e-05)
No. Of attempts to contact a taxpayer 2.711*** 1.743*** 1.771*** 2.724*** 1.756*** 1.789***
Firms Characteristics (0.238) (0.201) (0.164) (0.240) (0.204) (0.166)
Number of employees 1.000 0.999 0.995
Type of taxpayer (default categories:Maori Authority, 
Partnership, Society/Club, Trust) (0.00592) (0.0105) (0.00881)
Individual 1.147 0.881 0.903
(0.310) (0.296) (0.234)
Company 0.909 0.942 0.620**
Filing frequency (default category: one month filing) (0.221) (0.277) (0.143)
two_months_filing 1.086 0.545* 0.748
(0.388) (0.189) (0.233)
six_months_filing 1.093 0.372*** 0.642
(0.403) (0.139) (0.210)
Standardized Net Profit  in the tax year 2013-2014 0.993 0.998 1.375**
Economic Sector (0.0811) (0.0959) (0.202)
Agriculture 0.825 0.923 0.865
(0.272) (0.402) (0.279)
ConstructionIndustry 1.172 2.194*** 1.050
(0.270) (0.594) (0.255)
Property 0.720 1.797* 1.073
(0.195) (0.542) (0.271)
ProfServices 1.062 1.219 1.120
(0.341) (0.484) (0.353)
Constant 0.568*** 0.223*** 0.589*** 3.338 7.424* 9.411** 2.822 10.66* 16.72***
(0.0553) (0.0305) (0.0566) (3.276) (8.516) (9.454) (3.016) (13.25) (17.98)
Observations 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521
Pseudo R2
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Relative Risk Ratios. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0,0098 0,0825 0,0927
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Table 4 Multinomial Logit Results for Actual Behaviour 
 
VARIABLES
AutoSeizure 
Odds Ratios
Instalment 
Odds Ratios
PayNow 
Odds Ratios
AutoSeizure 
Odds Ratios
Instalment 
Odds Ratios
PayNow 
Odds Ratios
AutoSeizure 
Odds Ratios
Instalment 
Odds Ratios
PayNow 
Odds Ratios
Treatment  (BAU as default category)
Treatment A 0.602 1.018 1.047 0.518* 0.961 0.946 0.502* 0.966 0.964
(0.207) (0.322) (0.291) (0.186) (0.311) (0.279) (0.182) (0.314) (0.288)
Treatment B 0.593 0.966 0.729 0.527* 0.902 0.663 0.527* 0.923 0.677
(0.192) (0.291) (0.208) (0.178) (0.278) (0.200) (0.179) (0.286) (0.206)
Treatment C 0.647 0.738 0.904 0.552* 0.730 0.795 0.527* 0.721 0.778
(0.211) (0.249) (0.253) (0.189) (0.252) (0.237) (0.181) (0.252) (0.234)
log_TOTAL_GST DEBT (current and past debt) 0.798* 0.999 0.868 0.775** 1.000 0.833
Dummy variables for classes of current debt (default 
category: debt less or equal to $500 ) (0.0931) (0.128) (0.0964) (0.0923) (0.131) (0.0939)
60/90 days old GST debt (between $500-$1,000) 0.237*** 0.841 0.353*** 0.243*** 0.805 0.368***
(0.0949) (0.354) (0.121) (0.0981) (0.343) (0.127)
60/90 days old GST debt (between $1,000-$5,000) 0.453** 0.885 0.381*** 0.484* 0.871 0.420**
(0.173) (0.386) (0.136) (0.188) (0.384) (0.152)
60/90 days old GST debt (between$5,000-$10,000) 0.395* 0.521 0.124*** 0.406 0.541 0.126***
(0.219) (0.317) (0.0727) (0.228) (0.332) (0.0755)
60/90 days old GST debt (between $10,000-$50,000) 0.490 0.625 0.0782*** 0.512 0.611 0.0663***
(0.350) (0.460) (0.0705) (0.370) (0.457) (0.0628)
How many times in debt 1.049** 1.021 1.056*** 1.048** 1.021 1.061***
(0.0204) (0.0209) (0.0192) (0.0211) (0.0215) (0.0199)
No. of tax returns outstanding at the time of the campaign 0.926 0.550*** 0.730*** 0.926 0.538*** 0.741***
(0.0592) (0.100) (0.0768) (0.0596) (0.100) (0.0780)
No. of defaults on instalment agreement 0.0507*** 0.814 0.313*** 0.0508*** 0.786 0.295***
(0.0496) (0.118) (0.0893) (0.0497) (0.116) (0.0855)
No. of write offs applied to a taxpayer 0.991 0.992 0.998 0.993 0.993 0.996
(0.0129) (0.0162) (0.0173) (0.0134) (0.0171) (0.0169)
Amount of  write offs applied to a taxpayer 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(2.82e-06) (4.30e-06) (1.71e-05) (3.14e-06) (5.36e-06) (1.52e-05)
No. Of attempts to contact a taxpayer 0.812** 0.899 0.851* 0.808** 0.904 0.853*
Firms Characteristics (0.0805) (0.0834) (0.0769) (0.0802) (0.0851) (0.0779)
Number of employees 1.007 1.011 1.024**
Type of taxpayer (default categories:Maori Authority, 
Partnership, Society/Club, Trust) (0.0175) (0.0116) (0.0115)
Individual 0.806 1.842 0.998
(0.278) (0.702) (0.326)
Company 0.715 1.450 0.992
Filing frequency (default category: one month filing) (0.221) (0.517) (0.295)
two_months_filing 0.912 0.738 0.538
(0.437) (0.331) (0.217)
six_months_filing 1.114 0.746 0.898
(0.555) (0.349) (0.374)
Standardized Net Profit  in the tax year 2013-2014 1.080 0.934 0.929
Economic Sector (0.275) (0.204) (0.191)
Agriculture 1.036 1.288 1.187
(0.441) (0.558) (0.474)
ConstructionIndustry 0.571* 1.114 0.769
(0.188) (0.313) (0.219)
Property 1.177 1.129 1.467
(0.410) (0.409) (0.464)
ProfServices 0.766 0.750 0.983
(0.311) (0.333) (0.357)
Constant 0.527*** 0.431*** 0.629*** 23.41*** 0.790 11.42** 45.74*** 0.684 23.59**
(0.0694) (0.0608) (0.0783) (27.88) (1.045) (12.97) (61.06) (0.990) (29.43)
Observations 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521 1,521
Pseudo R2
Table XX:  Multinomial logit analysis for Actual behaviour, recorded six months after  the experiment. Relative Risk Ratios. Baseline category: Case open 
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Relative Risk Ratios. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 0.0022 0.0947 0.1049
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APPENDIX Descriptive Statistics for Treated and Non-Treated Groups 
This appendix reports some descriptive statistics on the sample on indebted taxpayers, and 
compares treated and non-treated groups. Table A1 reports sample percentage shares, means and 
standard deviations for key variables in our analysis in section 5. These are reported for separately 
for the three treated sub-groups, A, B and C. 
It can be seen that the usable sample of 1,521 late payers in our statistical analysis comprises of 
895 non-treated and a total of 626 treated (composed of roughly equal sub-groups (of 219, 205 and 
202 taxpayers). That is, each treated sub-group represents around 13-14% of the total sample. 
Figure A1 illustrates Table A1 data on the (60-90-day) GST liabilities of those groups, decomposed 
into debt size categories. This confirms that random selection of the four sub-groups yields similar 
percentages of taxpayers in each of the four size categories. Relatively low debt categories (<$5,000) 
dominate all four sub-groups, with around 40% of taxpayers in each of the <$1,000 and $1,000-
$5,000 categories. Treated group C has a slight over-representation of <$1,000, and under-
representation of $5,000-$10,000, taxpayers, relative to other sub-groups. 
Figure A1 GST Debt by (Grouped) Value for Treated and Non-Treated 
 
Considering other taxpayer characteristics in Table A1, it can be seen that mean values are 
generally similar across treated and non-treated groups and always well within one standard 
deviation of the relevant means. This confirms that random selection appears not to have generated 
any obvious anomalies across groups in these characteristics. 
Finally Table A2 cross-tabulates taxpayers’ compliance responses – compliance intentions 
during the intervention with subsequent actual compliance behaviour. This reveals, for example, 
that of the 276 taxpayers stating an intention to enter an instalment agreement, only 50 actually did 
so, with a further 28 paying off their debt in full by March 2015. However, a further 37 of those 
taxpayers had their repayments auto-seized, despite the apparent initially compliant response.  
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Table A1 Taxpayer Characteristics 
Variable: Taxpayers (Log) Total Debt 
No. Returns 
Outstanding 
No. Instalment 
Defaults No. Write-offs 
No. IRD Contact 
Attempts 
 No. Percent Mean (St. dev.) Mean (St. dev.) Mean (St. dev.) Mean (St. dev.) Mean (St. dev.) 
Non-treated 895 58.8 11.46 (1.49) 0.51 (1.78) 0.124 (0.47) 4.7 (8.9) 1.64 (1.15) 
Treated: A 219 14.4 11.45 (1.64) 0.45 (1.27) 0.137 (0.51) 5.4 (9.0) 1.41 (0.88) 
Treated: B 205 13.5 11.52 (1.52) 0.41 (1.09) 0.156 (0.60) 4.2 (7.9) 1.37 (1.01) 
Treated: C 202 13.3 11.23 (1.58) 0.54 (1.55) 0.183 (0.78) 4.4 (7.9) 1.55 (0.93) 
 
Table A1 (continued) Taxpayer Characteristics 
Variable: GST 60-90 Day Debt (%) Entity Type (%) Filing Frequency (%) 
  < $1k $1k-5k  $5k-10k  $10k-50k Total Company Individual Other Total Monthly 2-monthly 6-monthly Total 
Non-treated 44.4 39.9 10.5 5.3 100 59.1 24.3 16.7 100 4.4 59.5 36.1 100 
Treated: A 42.0 42.9 9.1 5.9 100 56.6 23.7 19.7 100 5.1 64.5 30.4 100 
Treated: B 43.9 37.6 10.7 7.8 100 55.6 24.9 19.5 100 2.5 62.6 34.9 100 
Treated: C 49.5 39.6 5.0 5.9 100 54.0 25.3 20.7 100 5.1 64.4 30.5 100 
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Table A2 Taxpayer Compliance Responses 
  Actual Responses (at March 2015) 
  Instalments 
Pay 
Now 
Auto-
seizure 
Case 
open Other TOTAL 
Stated 
Intended 
Responses 
(Aug-Sept 
2014) 
Instalments 50 28 37 123 38 276 
Pay Now 24 46 4 20 38 132 
No Response 29 74 45 40 287 475 
Not in Debt 4 20 27 12 173 236 
Other 17 11 18 105 251 402 
 TOTAL 124 179 131 300 787 1,521 
 
Table A3 also reveals that 123 of the 276 ‘instalment intention’ taxpayers were still in a ‘case 
open’ status by March 2015, suggesting that a substantial number of such taxpayers were still in an 
unresolved position regarding debt repayment despite their initial phone response during the 
experiment. On a more positive note, though only 46 taxpayers (out of 1,521) initially agreed to 
‘pay now’ during the intervention, 179 (12%) did in fact repay their debt in full by March 2015, 
with a further 124 (8%) in an instalment arrangement. Auto-seizure enabled IRD to obtain some 
debt repayment from an additional 131 (9%) of those taxpayers. 
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